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• This article critically analyses the prospects for introducing 
United States anti-fraud (or anti-false claims) laws in the 
Australian health care setting.
• Australian governments spend billions of dollars each year on 
medicines and health care. A recent report estimates that the 
money lost to corporate fraud in Australia is growing at an 
annual rate of 7%, but that only a third of the losses are 
currently being detected.
• In the US, qui tam provisions — the component of anti-fraud 
or anti-false claims laws involving payments to whistleblowers 
— have been particularly successful in providing critical 
evidence allowing public prosecutors to recover damages for 
fraud and false claims made by corporations in relation to 
federal and state health care programs.
• The US continues to strengthen such anti-fraud measures and 
to successfully apply them to a widening range of areas 
involving large public investment.
• Australia still suffers from the absence of any comprehensive 
scheme that not only allows treble damages recovery for 
fraud on the public purse, but crucially supports such actions 
by providing financial encouragement for whistleblowing 
corporate insiders to expose evidence of fraud. Potential 
areas of application could include direct and indirect 
government expenditure on health care service provision, 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, defence, carbon emissions 
compensation and tobacco-related illness.
• The creation in Australia of an equivalent to US anti-false 
claims legislation should be a policy priority, particularly in a 
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Risks of corporate fraud in Australian health care
In the US, the health sector is a major target for fraudulent
corporate activities, such as reporting false claims or costs, billing
for services or procedures not performed or medically unnecessary,
hiding improper financial arrangements with health care goods
and service providers, as well as promoting off-label uses to
physicians, lying about the true wholesale price and submitting
false performance records5 (Box 1).
In Australia, a recent representative proceeding (class action) in
the Federal Court found that Merck Sharpe and Dohme trained its
representatives to minimise physician concerns about adverse
cardiovascular effects of Vioxx (rofecoxib). The company even
created a publication called the Australasian Journal of Bone and
Joint Medicine, which was neither peer-reviewed nor independent,
to advertise a product subsequently found under the Trade Prac-
tices Act 1974 (Cwlth) to be defective (s 75AD) and not reasonably
fit for purpose (s 74B) or of merchantable quality (s 74D).6 This
heightens concerns that the Australian pharmaceutical market is
unlikely to be immune from US-style false claims and fraud, if only
because most of the major drug companies proven to have engaged
in such conduct against the US government also dominate the
Australian market (Box 2). A report by the University of Mel-
bourne and KPMG estimated that the total amount of money lost
to corporate fraud in Australia, including in the health care sector,
was about A$350 million in 2010 and growing at an annual rate of
7%, with only a third being detected.7
Under the Medicare Australia Act 1973 (Cwlth), Medicare is
empowered to monitor payments on claims paid for both Medicare
and the PBS for fraud. It does this through a program of audits as
well as sophisticated methods of data analysis. Under the Health
Insurance Act 1973 (Cwlth), civil penalties can be imposed on
providers of pathology or diagnostic services for asking for or
accepting prohibited benefits (s 23DZZIK), offering or providing
prohibited benefits (s 23DZZIL) and making threats to induce the
above conduct (s 23DZZIM) (Box 3). Within 6 years of a wrong-
doer contravening a civil penalty provision, the Chief Executive
Officer of Medicare Australia may apply on behalf of the Common-
wealth to the Federal Court for an order that the wrongdoer pay
the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty (s 125A(1)). In the 2006–
07 financial year, Medicare pursued 499 individuals for A$3.4
million in “incorrect payments” and 550 investigations into fraud-
ulent claiming were begun, with 79 referred to the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions, who successfully prosecuted 56
individuals to recover A$312 927.8 Yet in Australia (unlike the US)
large-scale anti-fraud and anti-competitive prosecutions in the
pharmaceutical sector have been rare. One example was the 2001
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission prosecution
in the Federal Court of Roche Vitamins Australia (A$15 million
penalty), BASF Australia (A$7.5 million) and Aventis Animal
Nutrition (A$3.5 million), in connection with a global price-fixing
cartel supplying vitamins A and E in animal feeds, which inflated
general food prices.9
Comparison with the anti-fraud measures in the US 
health care sector
The False Claims Act (31 US Code ss 3729-3733) (FCA) began
during the US Civil War and was substantially amended in 1986
by the Reagan administration, and in 2009 by the Obama adminis-ber 9 • 2 May 2011
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with “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the truth
submits, or conspires with another to submit, a false claim or
related false record:
• for payment from the US Government or from an entity
administering government funds; or
• to avoid or decrease an obligation to pay the US Government.
Qui tam provisions are a component of these false claims laws
that have proved extremely effective in encouraging whistleblow-
ers to provide (in a private–public enforcement partnership)
crucial “insider” evidence about corporate fraud in a wide range of
settings (Box 1). The words qui tam are an abbreviation of a Latin
legal maxim broadly meaning “he who sues on behalf of himself
also sues on behalf of the state”. Qui tam laws allow private citizens
(relators) the right to provide documents establishing fraud or false
claims (the terms are generally interchangeable in this context)
upon the government to a no win–no fee lawyer who, if convinced
of the merits, will fund and file with a Department of Justice office
a lawsuit under seal (not initially disclosed to the defendant)
(s 3730(b)). Whistleblowers are rewarded with between 15% and
30% of whatever proceeds the government recovers from the civil
suit (ss 3729(a), 3730(d)(1), 3730(d)(2)).10 The prospects of suc-
cess are greater if federal or state justice department officials can be
convinced to join the case.11 In such instances, the qui tam relator
and his or her counsel act as force multipliers for the often cash-
strapped public prosecutors, contributing valuable human and
financial resources to the action.
Qui tam whistleblower suits constitute about 80% of all false
claims actions and have been very successful in achieving substan-
tial recoveries from corporations in the health service, pharmaceu-
tical, education, defence, and oil and gas sectors.12 In 2010,
recoveries from pharmaceutical and medical device companies
accounted for 65% of the US$2.5 billion recovered from health
care fraud claims.13 Qui tam actions against pharmaceutical com-
panies are now the most successful type of anti-false claims
litigation14 (Box 4). In recent years, nearly half of all US states have
enacted their own anti-false claims statutes.
Treble damages, civil penalties and criminal offences
In addition to prosecution for criminal offences and penalties,
since 1986, the FCA has provided for treble damages, which the
US Supreme Court has held to be largely compensatory or
remedial rather than punitive.15 Treble damages give public law
enforcement agencies a substantial financial incentive to undertake
protracted investigations and actions, while the potential to receive
15%–30% of that amount creates a critical incentive for corporate
insiders to overcome their concerns about the risks associated with
whistleblowing (such as intimidation, loss of livelihood, friends
and family, and mental anguish).16 Civil fines of about US$11 000
per claim (eg, per billing item) are also imposed. Companies
convicted of offences under the FCA can be barred from involve-
ment in government programs, though some companies appear to
have circumvented this by shifting liability to subsidiary corporate
entities.
The expanding scope of the FCA
The range of fraudulent activities in health care covered by the
FCA is fairly broad and extends to prohibited conduct prescribed
in other federal statutes, such as the Anti-Kickback Statute of
1972, the Anti-Self Referral (“Stark”) Law of 1995, the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act 2009 and the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act 2010. False claims liability was an
important public interest protection built into the financial sector
bailouts of the Troubled Asset Relief Program under the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act 2008.
Although the FCA traditionally did not apply to taxation, in the
circumstances specified in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act 2006
(s 406), treble damages and whistleblower awards of 15%–30% of
the amount recovered by the Internal Revenue Service apply if the
tax, penalties and interest in dispute exceed US$2 million. It is
even arguable that anti-false claims actions may be available under
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco
Control Act) 2009, by which the US Food and Drug Administra-
tion specifies criteria for manufacturing, registration and market-
ing approvals for tobacco products (including receiving all relevant
1 Types of fraudulent and false claims successfully 
prosecuted under the United States False Claims Act*
• Billing for goods and services never delivered or rendered; 
marketing and lobbying; inappropriate or unnecessary medical 
procedures; work or tests not performed; inferior equipment as 
premium equipment; automatic laboratory tests based on range 
not request; patented drugs when generic drugs were provided; 
unlicensed or unapproved drugs; research that was never 
conducted.
• Billing at doctors rates for work by a nurse, resident or intern.
• Billing to increase revenue not for actual work performed.
• Double billing for the same goods or service.
• Unbundling — using multiple billing codes instead of one billing 
code for a drug panel test in order to increase remuneration.
• Bundling — billing for a panel when a single test was ordered.
• Upcoding — inflating bills by using diagnosis billing codes that 
suggest a more expensive illness or treatment.
• Charging for employees who were not actually on the job, or 
billing for made-up hours to maximise reimbursements.
• Failing to report known product defects in order to be able 
to continue to sell or bill the government for the product.
• Falsifying research data paid for by the government.
• “Lick and stick” prescription rebate fraud and “marketing the 
spread” prescription fraud (lying to the government about true 
wholesale price of prescription drugs).
• Pumping, mining or harvesting more natural resources from 
public lands than is actually reported to the government.
• Not reporting overpayment by the government.
• Misrepresenting the value or origin of imported goods.
• Falsely certifying that a contract falls within certain guidelines 
(ie, the contractor is part of a minority group or is a veteran).
• Submitting false performance records or samples.
• Presenting broken or untested equipment as operational.
• Certifying a product as having passed a test when it has not.
• Yield burning — skimming profits from sale of municipal bonds.
• Winning a contract through kickbacks or bribes.
• Prescribing a medicine or recommending a type of treatment 
or diagnosis regimen to win kickbacks from hospitals, laboratories 
or pharmaceutical companies.
• Forging physician signatures when such signatures are required 
for reimbursement from Medicare or Medicaid.
* Source: False Claims Act Legal Center website at http://www.taf.org/
legalupdate.htm.  ◆MJA • Volume 194 Number 9 • 2 May 2011 475
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government payments under Medicare and Medicaid for tobacco-
related illness.
In the words of the US Supreme Court, “the [FCA] was intended
to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result
in financial loss to the Government.”17 The enforcement partner-
ship has proven extremely cost-effective, recouping US$15 for
every US$1 spent on qui tam investigations and litigation.18 Qui
tam laws can act as potent deterrents for fraudulent activities as
they amplify the threat of detection and prosecution, and create
incentives for compliance with government requirements and
conditions. The relevant government law enforcement body
retains control. Where the government decides to intervene in the
action, it takes over the prosecution of the claim, and the relator
must tender full cooperation, or the government may compel the
court to limit the relator’s role in litigation (ss 3730(b)(4),
3730(c)(1), 3730(c)(2)(B), 3730(c)(2)(C)). Even if the govern-
ment refuses to intervene, allowing the relator to proceed with the
lawsuit on the government’s behalf (s 3730(b)(4)(B)), it still
actively monitors the case and has a right to review all pleadings
and to later join the case where good cause is shown
(ss 3730(b)(3), 3730(c)(3)). As such, fears about perverse incen-
tives driving enforcement19 or over-enforcement,20 are unfounded.
Checks and balances against inappropriate claims
Frivolous or parasitic qui tam claims are curtailed not only by the
large amounts that plaintiff lawyers acting for “relators” must pay
up-front and by scrutiny of the case by Department of Justice
officials, but by statutory bars to individuals who have made no
material contribution to uncovering the fraud or providing the
factual basis of the claim.12 In a recent case where the relator could
not identify each false claim the defendant had submitted to US
Medicare and Medicaid, the court found that the relator’s allegations
were sufficiently particular because they identified the providers
whom the defendant had caused to submit false claims, the dates of
the claims, the monetary amounts, and the number of claims.21
The 2009 amendments to the FCA clarified that, while a relator
cannot base a qui tam action on publicly disclosed allegations
(already in a government report, hearing, audit or investigation or
in the media), a court may still have jurisdiction if the Attorney
General nonetheless decides to bring the action, or if the relator is
the original source of that information (s 3730(e)(4)(A)). Original
source is defined as “an individual who has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based”
(s 3730(e)(4)(B)).
Implementing qui tam legislation in Australia
A comparison with the situation in the US strongly suggests that
one reason for the lack of large-scale anti-fraud and anti-false
claims actions in the pharmaceutical and health care sectors in
Australia may relate to the lack of insider information from private
corporations provided to law enforcement officials. Whistleblow-
ing is an infrequent phenomenon from within the Australian
health care sector; it is not encouraged, rewarded or adequately
protected.22 In 1989, a federal committee recommended that qui
tam laws were incompatible with accepted practice in the Austral-
ian legal system.23 By 2011, however, significant progress has been
made in Australia towards a uniform legislative regime for protect-
ing whistleblowers from unjust reprisals.24 The potential applica-
tion of US qui tam laws to facilitate whistleblowing about fraud and
false claims from within the Australian private corporate health
care and pharmaceutical sectors again has been suggested to the
Australian Government (TA F, invited oral testimony to the Aus-
tralian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs,18 Sep 2008). Given the scale of public
investment in the Australian health care service, pharmaceutical,
medical device and other health-related industries, we believe that
an anti-fraud regime based on that of the US should be introduced
in Australia. Such laws comport with developing Australian legal
principles and are likely to prove as effective here as they have
been in the US.
Over the past 20 years, anti-competitive behaviour has increas-
ingly been regarded as a serious crime by Australian regulators. No
win–no fee advertising is now common, and litigation funding
3 Offences with penalties under the Health Insurance Act 
1973 (Cwlth) that could also allow governments to 
recover treble damages if qui tam statutes were 
enacted in Australia
• Prohibition of certain medical insurance (s 126).
• Preclusion on agreements to assign Medicare benefits (s 127).
• Offences in relation to tax returns (s 128).
• False statements relating to Medicare benefits (s 128A).
• Knowingly making false statements relating to Medicare benefits 
(s 128B).
• Charging fees for provision of public hospital services to public 
patients (s 128C).
• Making false statements (s 129).
• Bribery in relation to admissions to private hospitals (s 129AA). ◆
2 Eight Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) 
suppliers with highest market share and representative 
United States False Claims Act (FCA) actions against 
their related companies in the US
Australia US
PBS
supplier
Market 
share*
Related
company
FCA
action
Alphapharm 14% Mylan Inc. US$65 million 
(2010)
Pfizer Australia 10% Pfizer Inc. US$2300 million 
(2009)
Sigma 10% Aspen USA None
AstraZeneca 
Australia
9% AstraZeneca 
US
US$520 million 
(2010)
Sanofi-Aventis 
ANZ
8% Sanofi-Aventis 
US
US$95.5 million 
(2009)
GlaxoSmithKline 
Australia
5% GlaxoSmithKline 
US
US$150 million 
(2005); US$750 
million (2010)
Merck Sharpe and 
Dohme (Australia)
3% Merck US$650 million 
(2008)
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Australia
3% Bristol-Myers 
Squibb
US$515 million 
(2007)
* Based on number of prescriptions in the 2008–09 financial year.1 ◆476 MJA • Volume 194 Number 9 • 2 May 2011
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The Australian High Court has now supported the right of any
person to seek injunctive relief for a breach of specified provisions
of the Trade Practices Act against a corporation.26 It has also
upheld the capacity of a plaintiff to bring an action, not to
vindicate a private right, but to prevent the violation of a public
right or to enforce the performance of a public duty.27,28
Litigation-funding companies in Australia already accept the risk
of paying the other side’s costs if a case fails, in return for a set
share of the proceeds if it succeeds. These arrangements have
withstood challenges in Australian courts, in part because they
fulfil public policy imperatives such as access to justice, particu-
larly in public health-related class actions.25
While some Australian courts may consider the treble damages
provided for under the FCA to be an extraordinary remedy,
appropriate only in cases of truly outrageous conduct,29 others are
likely to agree with US courts that treble damages in qui tam
actions are primarily remedial in nature10 or even justifiably
punitive.30 Moreover, treble damages have been considered previ-
ously as a deterrent for insider trading, and Australian regulators
have generally been in favour of them.31 Considerable financial
benefits would arise from applying such damages even to existing
penalties under, for example, the Health Insurance Act (Box 3).
The recently announced Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 could
include provisions establishing an anti-fraud system related to
industry claims required to be made under government regulation
of the manufacture and marketing of tobacco (including manda-
tory disclosure of tobacco industry research about the harmfulness
or addictiveness of its products).
The key strengths of the US qui tam anti-fraud regime, particu-
larly in a period of financial stringency, lie in its recovery of large
amounts of public monies, its encouragement of good corporate
4 Prominent qui tam claims in the United States pharmaceutical industry, 2001–2010
Company Year
Settlement* 
(US$ million)
Relator’s share† 
(US$ million) Drug Fraudulent or false claim
TAP 2001 875 95.0 (10.9%) Lupron Reported false average sale price for drugs reimbursed 
by Medicare and Medicaid; anti-kickback violations
Bayer 2003 257 34.2 (13.3%) Cipro, Adalat CC Illegal sale of cheaper relabelled drugs to private 
payers; falsified information to avoid paying rebates to 
the government
Warner-Lambert 2004 430 24.6 (5.7%) Neurontin Illegal marketing for off-label use unapproved by the 
FDA; false claims about the safety of the drug
Schering-Plough 2004 345 31.7 (9.2%) Claritin Anti-kickback violations to protect top-selling allergy 
drug
GlaxoSmithKline 2005 150 26.0 (17.3%) Zofran, Kytril Reported false average sale price for drugs reimbursed 
by Medicare and Medicaid
Serono 2005 704 51.8 (7.4%) Serostim Anti-kickback violations to make patients appear to be 
candidates for the drug
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2007 515 50.0 (9.7%) Pravachol, Glucophage 
and others
Illegal marketing for off-label uses unapproved by the 
FDA; anti-kickback violations to induce prescription 
Merck 2008 650 68.0 (10.5%) Vioxx, Pepcid Anti-kickback violations to induce prescription; failed to 
administer proper rebates to government programs 
Cephalon 2008 425 46.5 (11.0%) Provigil, Gabitril, 
Actiq
Illegal marketing for off-label uses unapproved by the 
FDA
Eli Lilly 2009 1400 79.0 (5.6%) Zyprexa and others Illegal marketing for off-label uses to children and to 
elderly patients in long-term care facilities; false claims 
about the safety of the drug
Alpharma Inc. 2009 42.5 5.3 (12.5%) Kadian Anti-kickback violations to induce prescriptions; false 
claims about the safety and efficacy of the drug
Pfizer Inc. 2009 2300 102.0 (4.4%) Bextra and others False claims submitted to Medicare and Medicaid 
based on off-label uses unapproved by the FDA
Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals
2010 72.5 7.8 (10.8%) TOBI False claims submitted to Medicare and Medicaid 
based on off-label uses unapproved by the FDA
Johnson and Johnson 2010 81 9.0 (11.1%) Topamax Illegal marketing for off-label uses unapproved by the 
FDA; anti-kickback violations to induce prescriptions
AstraZeneca 2010 520 45.0 (8.7%) Seroquel Anti-kickback violations; illegal marketing for off-label 
uses unapproved by the FDA 
GlaxoSmithKline 2010 750 96.0 (12.8%) Paxil CR, Avandamet, 
Bactroban, Kytril
Manufactured and distributed defective and 
adulterated drugs from now-closed manufacturing 
facility in Puerto Rico
FDA = Food and Drug Administration. * Includes criminal fines. † Average relator’s share = US$50.8 million (10.4%). Percentages are calculated against the entire recovery 
to government, including criminal fines and civil recoveries to the federal and state governments. In practice, the relator does not receive a share of the criminal fine or 
the civil recovery to a state that does not have a qui tam statute; thus percentages and amounts eligible for relator’s share would be higher than those reported here.  ◆MJA • Volume 194 Number 9 • 2 May 2011 477
MEDICINE AND THE LAWpractice, the incentives it provides and the protection it affords
whistleblowers from within the private sector, and its various
checks and balances to ensure that only presumptively meritorious
claims are processed. If designed carefully, Australian qui tam anti-
fraud laws may provide a mechanism for sustained and diligent
oversight of claims by health care services, the financial sector, and
the pharmaceutical, medical device, defence and fossil fuel indus-
tries on the public purse without significantly impeding their
growth. Australian qui tam legislation could also play a significant
role in reducing fraud and false claims in relation to other large
investments or redistributions of public monies in public health-
related fields such as carbon emissions compensation and the costs
of treating tobacco-related illness.
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